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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Deterrence strategies involve trying to influence the decision-making of another actor. 
Because of this, efforts to determine whether to employ a strategy of deterrence or how to 
implement such a strategy require attempting to forecast what things will influence the other 
actor and how that influence will be exerted. There are several models or frameworks 
available that could assist with efforts to anticipate how another actor will be influenced. In 
practice, the most prominent public debates related to deterrence in the United States have 
tended to reflect two main approaches. People tend to assume either that the other side will 
behave like a rational actor or that it will be driven by a unique strategic culture. While both 
approaches have merit, extensive critiques have revealed that both also have significant 
limitations.  
This research project reviews three other approaches that have been applied to studying 
deterrence: social constructivism, domestic politics, and psychology and neuroscience. None 
of these approaches, either alone or in combination, offers a perfect framework for 
predicting the outcomes of deterrence efforts. Each adds valuable insights, however, that are 
relevant to developing deterrence strategies. They draw attention to the degree of overlap in 
how the two sides understand key issues related to deterrence, to the range of internal debate 
on the other side, and to common biases and heuristics likely to affect the decisions of actors 
on the receiving end of deterrent threats. In particular, recent work has highlighted the 
dangers of pushing the other side into the domain of losses or tapping into underlying 
concerns about justice and fairness.  
This study recommends that, in thinking about whether and how to deter other actors, 
analysts make use of all the different models available for anticipating how the other side will 
be influenced. This will not guarantee success in deterrence, but compared to relying on just 
a single framework for thinking about deterrence, use of multiple perspectives should reduce 
the chances of overlooking a critical flaw in deterrence planning. Making sure that 
policymakers and planners are familiar with a range of alternative approaches should 
therefore improve the U.S. ability to craft effective deterrent strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Far from being a relic of the Cold War, questions about deterrence are a recurring feature in 
U.S. policy debates. In the waning days of summer 2013, the U.S. government found itself 
wrestling with how to respond to a likely deterrence failure involving the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. The Syria case raises important questions about deterrence. Was the Assad 
regime undeterrable, making it unwise for President Obama to have announced that CW use 
would cross a red line? Or did deterrence fail because the United States did not take the right 
steps to make its deterrent threat credible? 
As with the Syria case, two big questions are typically involved in deterrence debates. First, 
can some other actor be deterred? Would an Iran with nuclear bombs, for example, be 
subject to deterrence? Second, if deterrence is possible, how is it best achieved? What will it 
take to deter the other actor from a particular course of action? This second question can be 
just as contentious as the first. Right up to the end of the Cold War, western analysts 
disagreed about what threats would most effectively deter the Soviet Union. Some believed 
that the ability to convey a risk that a significant percentage of the Soviet population and 
economy would be destroyed would be sufficient to induce caution in Soviet leaders. Others 
argued that the Soviet regime cared only about the survival of the Communist Party elite, 
meaning that deterrent threats would have to find ways to target those elites directly. 
Public discussions of deterrence tend to revolve around two basic perspectives: treating the 
other side as a rational actor or instead as a product of a unique strategic culture. Participants 
in policy debates might not know or invoke the academic labels for these approaches, but 
their arguments tend to reflect the assumptions of one or the other. There are other 
approaches, however, to trying to understand human behavior and decision-making. The 
deterrence debates that take place among American elites have been truncated in nature. 
They are unnecessarily narrow, because they do not take full advantage of existing 
alternatives to rational actor and strategic culture models. 
The following report has several inter-related objectives. First, it seeks to show that debates 
about deterrence among U.S. policymakers, defense intellectuals, and other elite 
commentators have been dominated by arguments that reflect rationalist and culturalist 
approaches. These are not the only approaches that inform deterrence debates, but they are 
  6 	  
consistently more prominent than alternative ways of thinking about deterrence. Second, this 
report evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of both rational actor and strategic culture 
models. Both approaches have been the subject of strong critiques, and this report will 
summarize the limitations of both approaches. Third, because the two most common 
approaches to thinking about deterrence both have significant limitations, this report seeks 
to summarize several alternatives for analyzing deterrence strategy. It will review three 
alternatives: social constructivism, approaches based on domestic and bureaucratic politics, 
and behavioral approaches drawn from findings in psychology and neuroscience. None of 
these represents a new approach to deterrence in academic research. Instead, each of the 
three alternatives comes from a well-established body of work in International Relations (IR) 
and Security Studies. The goal here is to help policymakers, defense planners, and other 
relevant elites to become more familiar with these approaches. As with rational actor and 
strategic culture approaches, this report will summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the 
other three alternatives. It will show that none of the three alternatives, either singly or in 
combination with the others, offers a complete framework for analyzing deterrence. This 
report concludes that, in the absence of any fully reliable model, it will be useful to think in 
terms of multiple approaches to analyzing potential deterrence situations. The overarching 
objective for this report is to sensitize decision-makers and planners to the multiple ways 
available for thinking about deterrence and the value of incorporating insights from all of 
them. 
WHY “MODELS” ARE RELEVANT TO DETERRENCE POLICY AND 
PLANNING 
Although academic jargon is often opaque and the objectives of academic research quite 
different from what policymakers are concerned with, academic frameworks can still be 
relevant to the tasks that confront policymakers and planners. Practitioners often make 
decisions or develop plans based on implicit underlying assumptions about how the world 
works. These assumptions can be strikingly similar to those that inform academic theories or 
approaches. This is especially true in the case of deterrence. Because of what deterrence is 
about, general approaches for analyzing human behavior and decision-making have 
tremendous relevance. 
  7 	  
Deterrence is about influence. A deterrence strategy seeks to influence the decision calculus 
of another actor. This makes it relevant to consider what influences people in general, and 
what specifically might influence the particular actor in question. From the perspective of 
somebody concerned about strategy, the ideal goal is the ability to predict the other side’s 
behavior. Can the other side be deterred from a course of action? If so, what will be most 
effective in deterring it?  
To predict whether another actor will be influenced, it helps to have some ideas about what 
makes people tick and how to influence them. Hence, an actor contemplating deterrence 
must make some assumptions about how others think. Without some idea about how to 
influence others, without some prediction of whether one’s strategy will actually influence 
the other, it becomes hard to reach any conclusions about the merits of a potential 
deterrence strategy. Deterrence requires some attempt to predict what will influence the 
other actor, and for this reason people analyzing deterrent options will likely make some 
assumptions about the other side’s decision calculus. The assumptions or ideas that guide 
thinking about deterrence usually derive from some general notion of what shapes the 
behavior and decisions of people, including collective actors such as states or terrorist 
organizations – and these general notions often resemble academic theories that deal with 
similar questions. For this reason, academic frameworks for understanding human behavior 
and decision-making could prove relevant to deterrence planning, and it will be helpful to be 
familiar with the full range of existing frameworks. The next section of this report 
summarizes the approaches that have historically had the greatest impact on thinking about 
deterrence. 
THE PARAMETERS OF TRADITIONAL DETERRENCE DEBATES 
Humans have practiced deterrence since time immemorial. It took the invention of nuclear 
weapons, however, to stimulate people to think deeply about deterrence. The major theories 
of deterrence are products of the nuclear age. 
In the West, and especially the United States, deterrence theory initially developed primarily 
on the basis of a rational actor assumption. Three factors contributed to this. First, 
fortunately for humanity, the world lacks any clear evidence of how nuclear war breaks out. 
Ever since the Soviet Union joined the United States in the nuclear club, there has been no 
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use of nuclear weapons against another actor. In the absence of historical cases to study, it 
made sense to work with more abstract models to develop theories of nuclear deterrence. 
Second, in the early decades of the Cold War, Western analysts also found it difficult to 
obtain reliable information about decision-making in the highly secretive Soviet system. 
Without a clear understanding of how Soviet thinkers perceived nuclear weapons, relying on 
a generic rational actor assumption made it possible to develop some ideas about how 
nuclear deterrence might operate. Third, a rational actor framework also fit well with 
intellectual trends at the time. Tools such as game theory were first coming into vogue 
around the middle of the twentieth century, and it was natural that they would influence a 
subject involving “games” of strategy such as deterrence. 
In academic Political Science, rational choice approaches have become associated with the 
use of formal models, such as extensive-form game theory models. In the most influential 
early thinking about nuclear strategy, however, analysts tended to employ the rational actor 
assumption more informally – they used it to think through basic requirements for 
deterrence. Examples include William Kaufmann’s work on the elements of credibility,1 
Albert Wohlstetter’s insights on the importance of deploying weapons in a survivable basing 
mode,2 and perhaps above all the hugely influential writings of Thomas Schelling.3 
By the 1960s, this approach had also begun to influence the U.S. strategic posture. Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara’s adoption of “assured destruction” as the basis for determining 
the U.S. nuclear posture flowed from an assumption that a certain level of destruction would 
be adequate to deter any rational actor, including the Soviet Union.4 Familiar notions of 
crisis stability and strategic stability, and the mainstream theory of arms control, all took 
shape in this period on the basis of an informal rational actor assumption. Work in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  William	  W.	  Kaufmann,	  “The	  Requirements	  of	  Deterrence,”	  in	  William	  W.	  Kaufmann,	  ed.,	  Military	  
Policy	  
and	  National	  Security	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  Univ.	  Press,	  1956).	  2	  Albert	  Wohlstetter,	  Fred	  S.	  Hoffman,	  Robert	  J.	  Lutz	  and	  Henry	  S.	  Rowen,	  Selection	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  
Strategic	  Air	  Bases,	  a	  report	  prepared	  for	  United	  States	  Air	  Force	  Project	  RAND,	  R-­‐266	  (Santa	  Monica,	  CA:	  RAND	  Corporation,	  April	  1954).	  3	  Thomas	  C.	  Schelling,	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Conflict	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1960),	  and	  Arms	  
and	  Influence	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1966).	  4	  Good	  histories	  of	  U.S.	  nuclear	  strategy	  include	  Fred	  Kaplan,	  The	  Wizards	  of	  Armageddon	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1983);	  Michael	  Mandelbaum,	  The	  Nuclear	  Question:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  
Nuclear	  Weapons,	  1946-­‐1976	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1979);	  and	  Lawrence	  Freedman,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Nuclear	  Strategy,	  3rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2003).	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tradition has become so widespread that is has been given its own label, rational deterrence 
theory (RDT). 
By the 1970s, RDT had come under assault from a variety of critics. In the academic 
literature, many of the critiques focused on psychological constraints on rationality (this 
literature is discussed below). In the publicly most prominent debates about policy, however, 
the critique came from a somewhat different direction. Evidence about Soviet thinking on 
nuclear weapons had begun to emerge, and it troubled many observers. Soviet military 
writing about nuclear weapons did not reflect the same assumption common in civilian 
academic writing in the West that there was no meaningful way to use nuclear weapons to 
fight a war. The Soviet military buildup also seemed to defy predictions that the Soviet 
Union would accept the logic of parity and refrain from seeking a military advantage. Critics 
of mainstream U.S. thinking about nuclear strategy charged that, for reasons of history, 
geography, national identity, and the nature of the Communist system, Soviet leaders simply 
thought differently about nuclear war than did their Western counterparts. Historian Richard 
Pipes put forward the most widely read public statement of this position,5 but other analysts 
such as Colin Gray, Keith Payne, and Fritz Ermath also made the case that the U.S. and 
Soviet approaches to nuclear strategy diverged widely.6 Jack Snyder coined the term 
“strategic culture” to capture these differences,7 and that term stuck as the label for the 
primary public alternative to the rational actor model of deterrence (RAM). 
This line of reasoning also had a significant influence on U.S. policy. It provided the basis 
for the Carter administration to adopt what it called the “countervailing strategy.” Echoing 
the academic critique, administration officials such as Defense Secretary Harold Brown 
argued that the United States could no longer take a “mirror image” approach and assume 
that threats sufficient to deter U.S. leaders would also deter Soviet leaders. Instead, U.S. 
nuclear targeting would hold at risk what the United States thought Soviet leaders valued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Richard	  Pipes,	  “Why	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  Thinks	  It	  Could	  Fight	  and	  Win	  a	  Nuclear	  War,”	  Commentary	  (July	  1977).	  6	  Colin	  S.	  Gray	  and	  Keith	  Payne,	  “Victory	  Is	  Possible,”	  Foreign	  Policy	  (summer	  1980);	  Fritz	  W.	  Ermath,	  “Contrasts	  in	  American	  and	  Soviet	  Strategic	  Thought,	  International	  Security	  (fall	  1978).	  7	  Jack	  L.	  Snyder,	  The	  Soviet	  Strategic	  Culture:	  Implications	  for	  Limited	  Nuclear	  Operations,	  RAND	  report	  R-­‐2154-­‐AF	  (Santa	  Monica:	  RAND,	  1977).	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most: the survival of Communist Party elites and their instruments for maintaining political 
control.8 
The strategic culture approach has continued to influence deterrence strategy to this day. In 
the 2000s, the George W. Bush administration adopted a framework it called “tailored 
deterrence.”9 A version of this approach has been maintained by the Obama administration. 
As Jeffrey Lantis has astutely observed, the tailored deterrence strategy rests upon a strategic 
culture framework.10 U.S. deterrence planning documents do not base a tailored approach 
exclusively upon cultural factors and in practice seek to incorporate some of the other 
factors discussed below.11 Yet the cultural approach is implicit in the basic assumptions of 
tailored deterrence. The tailored framework assumes that every country has a distinct and 
different national style. The goal of deterrence planning, therefore, becomes “to hold at risk 
what the other side values most.” 
THE CONTINUING PROMINENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL POLES 
When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the question of how to prevent major nuclear war 
became less pressing. Broader questions about deterrence did not go away however. New 
threats emerged, and with them familiar debates about whether they could be deterred and, 
if so, how. None of these debates revolves exclusively around rational versus cultural 
approaches, but in all of them there is a tendency for these to become the two most 
prominent poles in the debate. 
The period before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides a good example. The 
intelligence failures concerning Iraqi WMD make it hard to remember the terms of the 
debate before the war. Prior to the invasion, the main axis of public debate was not whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On	  adoption	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  countervailing	  strategy,	  see	  Scott	  D.	  Sagan,	  Moving	  Targets:	  Nuclear	  
Strategy	  and	  National	  Security	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1990);	  William	  E.	  Odom,	  “The	  Origins	  and	  Design	  of	  Presidential	  Decision-­‐59:	  A	  Memoir,”	  in	  Henry	  D.	  Sokolski,	  ed.,	  Getting	  MAD:	  
Nuclear	  Mutual	  Assured	  Destruction,	  Its	  Origins	  and	  Practice	  (Carlisle,	  PA:	  U.S.	  Army	  War	  College,	  Strategic	  Studies	  Institute,	  2004);	  Walter	  Slocombe,	  “The	  Countervailing	  Strategy,”	  International	  
Security	  (spring	  1981).	  9	  See	  M.	  Elaine	  Bunn,	  “Can	  Deterrence	  Be	  Tailored?”	  Strategic	  Forum	  (Jan.	  2007)	  for	  a	  good	  short	  summary	  of	  this	  approach.	  10	  Jeffrey	  S.	  Lantis,	  “Strategic	  Culture	  and	  Tailored	  Deterrence,”	  Contemporary	  Security	  Policy	  (Dec.	  2009).	  11	  Deterrence	  Operations	  Joint	  Operating	  Concept,	  v.	  2.0	  (Offutt	  Air	  Force	  Base,	  Neb.:	  US	  Strategic	  Command,	  December	  2006).	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Saddam had WMD, but whether a Saddam armed with WMD could be contained and 
deterred. Supporters of launching a preventive attack on Iraq argued Saddam was a 
deterrence failure waiting to happen. Their arguments were not exclusively cultural; rather, 
they pointed to a mix of Saddam’s personal tendencies to misperception, the lack of 
effective reality checks in the dictatorial Iraqi system, as well as a variety of factors reflecting 
Arab culture, recent history, and political dynamics.12 Critics of this analysis argued largely 
from a rational actor perspective. They claimed that a shrewd political survivor like Saddam 
would understand that certain actions could prompt nuclear retaliation, and that he had 
nothing to gain from using WMD (or giving them to terrorists) that could rationally 
outweigh the costs of provoking a nuclear response.13 
More recent debates about whether to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities have been remarkably 
similar. Opponents of preventive attacks tend to assume that, should Iran cross the 
threshold to become a nuclear weapon state, it will soon find itself subject to the same logic 
of nuclear deterrence as all other nuclear-armed states, and it will quickly realize that it 
cannot use its nuclear weapons without inviting national destruction.14 Others argue that Iran 
is different. Because of elements in Persian culture and history, combined with the particular 
form of Shiite religious beliefs embraced by Iran’s clerical leaders, the country’s leaders 
might actually embrace martyrdom. According to this view, a nuclear Iran might become the 
first nation-state to act as a suicide bomber.15 Determining which view – if either – offers the 
better basis for predicting future Iranian behavior is hence a question for which the stakes 
could prove to be quite high. 
The terms “rational actor model” and “strategic culture” represent academic labels. But the 
issues involved are not purely academic. Real-world debates about deterrence – whether it is 
possible, and how best to achieve it – often rest on arguments derived from these two 
frameworks. This makes it crucial to evaluate them. Is one consistently more reliable than 
the other? Is either an adequate guide to deterrence planning? Are these the only options, or 
are there other ways to think about deterrence that could be useful? The next two sections of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Kenneth	  M.	  Pollack,	  The	  Threatening	  Storm:	  The	  Case	  for	  Invading	  Iraq	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2002).	  13	  John	  J.	  Mearsheimer	  and	  Stephen	  M.	  Walt,	  “An	  Unnecessary	  War,”	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Jan./Feb.	  2003).	  14	  For	  an	  extreme	  statement	  of	  this	  position,	  see	  Kenneth	  N.	  Waltz,	  “Why	  Iran	  Should	  Get	  the	  Bomb,”	  
Foreign	  Affairs	  (July/Aug.	  2012).	  15	  Adam	  Garfinkle,	  “Culture	  and	  Deterrence,”	  Foreign	  Policy	  Research	  Institute	  e-­‐notes,	  Aug.	  25,	  2006.	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this report analyze the strengths and weaknesses of rational actor and strategic culture 
approaches, respectively. Subsequent sections introduce several alternative approaches. 
THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Multiple approaches for analyzing deterrence exist in part because it is hard to demonstrate 
that any one of them is unambiguously superior. Rather, each has distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. This section identifies some key advantages and disadvantages of a rational 
actor assumption. Because the literature on rational theories of deterrence is vast, this 
section makes no attempt to summarize the full range of research.16 This report also steers 
clear of the lively debate over whether rational actor approaches require the use of formal 
game-theoretic models. The question of concern here, rather, involves the policy-relevant 
strengths and weaknesses of assuming the other side is a more-or-less rational actor. 
STRENGTHS 
Conflict situations tend to push parties involved to make strategic calculations. As best as 
possible, they have to think ahead about how to advance their objectives and block the other 
side from imposing unacceptable losses on them. This provides the strongest argument for 
working with a rational actor framework: the assumption of rationality leads naturally to a 
focus on the element of strategic calculation in conflict situations. Whatever else is going on, 
some part of the reasoning process will probably involve judgments about whether a 
particular course of action is likely to succeed or fail and the gains and losses likely to follow 
from taking the action. These calculations can fruitfully be captured by thinking of the other 
side as a rational actor. 
Even critics of rational deterrence theory can embrace this point. Colin Gray, for instance, is 
a leading proponent of the strategic culture approach. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, 
Gray rejected the widespread assumption that terrorism cannot be deterred. A common view 
emerged that sees suicide terrorists as irrational religious fanatics who want to kill themselves 
in order to reap promised heavenly rewards. Gray, and others, observed however that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  For	  literature	  reviews	  ,	  see	  Paul	  K.	  Huth,	  ”Deterrence	  and	  International	  Conflict:	  Empirical	  Findings	  and	  Theoretical	  Debates,”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  2	  (1999);	  and	  Vesna	  Danilovic	  and	  Joe	  Clare,	  “Deterrence	  and	  Crisis	  Bargaining,”	  in	  International	  Studies	  Compendium,	  ed.	  Robert	  E.	  Denemark	  (New	  York:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2010).	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terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have political goals and use terrorism strategically as a tool 
for trying to achieve their goals. This means they still think strategically, and as such they can 
in principle be deterred through efforts to deny them the ability to use terror to achieve their 
objectives.17 
Related to this point, an assumption of rationality can be a useful safeguard against a 
tendency to stereotype an adversary. On the one hand, this can help guard against a risky 
assumption that the other side cannot be as smart and capable as one’s own side. Treating 
the other as rational encourages a certain level of respect for potential adversaries that can be 
useful in getting one’s own side not to let down its guard. On the other hand, as a corrective 
to stereotyping, the rationality assumption can also help analysts avoid giving up on 
deterrence prematurely should they have an inaccurate view of the other side as too fanatical 
or irrational to be subject to deterrence. 
Advocates of rational actor approaches also highlight a number of advantages that should 
make this approach attractive to those wrestling with questions about deterrence. An 
assumption of rationality makes it possible to simplify a situation. One can strip away much 
of the detail of individual cases in order to focus on the underlying strategic logic of the 
situation. By permitting simplification, the rationality assumption makes it easier for an 
analyst to model a situation and think through the likely consequences of alternative courses 
of action. 
Related to this, the rational actor approach also encourages logical rigor. In rational actor 
approaches, analysts usually have to make their starting assumptions clear and reason 
deductively to reach conclusions. This makes the underlying logic of the argument fairly easy 
to follow and makes it possible to check if conclusions have been reached in a logically 
consistent manner. Rigor does not guarantee good results. An analyst could still misconstrue 
the situation and work with a model that is a poor match to the actual situation. The need to 
reason logically, however, still provides a safeguard against sloppy thinking. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Colin	  S.	  Gray,	  Maintaining	  Effective	  Deterrence,	  Strategic	  Studies	  Institute	  monograph	  (Carlisle,	  PA:	  U.S.	  Army	  War	  College,	  Aug.	  2003).	  See	  also	  Paul	  K.	  Davis	  and	  Brian	  Michael	  Jenkins,	  Deterrence	  and	  
Influence	  in	  Counterterrorism:	  A	  Component	  in	  the	  War	  on	  al	  Qaeda	  (Santa	  Monica,	  CA:	  RAND,	  2002),	  and	  Robert	  F.	  Trager	  and	  Dessislava	  P.	  Zagorcheva,	  “Deterring	  Terrorism:	  It	  Can	  Be	  Done,”	  
International	  Security	  (winter	  2005/06).	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A rational actor approach has one other important strength. It sometimes leads to valuable 
insights that are not obvious or even counterintuitive. In rational deterrence theory, one of 
the most profound insights has resulted from using an expected utility framework to analyze 
the choices of the other side. Expected utility analysis simply assumes that an actor has 
alternative options available and chooses the course of action that it expects to provide the 
highest net utility. Applied to deterrence, one can assume that the other side is choosing 
between two options: to attack, or not to attack. If it estimates expected costs and benefits 
for both choices, it chooses whichever option is relatively better. This has a significant 
implication. If the costs of not attacking are too high, that is if continuing with the status 
quo is perceived as highly negative, a rational actor might defy deterrent threats and launch 
an attack even if it views one’s deterrent threat as credible.18 A defender can make sure the 
costs of an attack will outweigh the benefits for the other side, but if living with the 
continuation of current trends is seen as having even greater cost, it can still be rational for 
the challenger to attack.  
This means that an effective deterrence strategy must take into account the costs and 
benefits for the other side of not challenging, that is of continuing to show restraint. In 
practice, U.S. planning guidance has recognized this insight. The Deterrence Operations Joint 
Operating Concept describes “encouraging adversary restraint” as a form of deterrence.19 It is 
not clear that the actions required to do this should properly be defined as deterrence, but 
they can contribute to shaping a context in which deterrence is more likely to be effective. 
Sometimes, it is useful to alleviate the other side’s fears about what will happen if it 
continues to accept the status quo and/or offer it benefits for continued good behavior. This 
useful insight emerged from work in the rational deterrence framework. Even though there 
are significant limitations to the rational actor approach, this insight is worth holding on to, 
as it will continue to be valid even if one moves to incorporate elements of other approaches 
into the analysis of deterrence. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  A	  possible	  historical	  example	  might	  be	  the	  1973	  Yom	  Kippur	  War.	  Sadat	  expected	  to	  lose	  the	  war	  with	  Israel.	  But	  starting	  a	  war	  and	  being	  defeated	  was	  still	  preferable	  to	  continuing	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  Egypt	  no	  longer	  possessed	  the	  Sinai.	  19	  Deterrence	  Operations	  Joint	  Operating	  Concept.	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WEAKNESSES 
Some weaknesses of rational deterrence theory are well known, because they are in many 
ways the starting point for alternative approaches. For those attracted to a strategic culture 
approach, rational approaches suffer from a tendency to assume all actors share the same 
values. Although rational choice approaches do not require that all actors have the same 
utility function, discussions of nuclear deterrence informed by a rational actor assumption 
seem in practice to assume that all states will be equally motivated to avoid societal 
destruction. This discounts the possibility that some dictators, particularly those motivated 
by an extremist ideology, will be willing to risk a lot of harm to their own populations in 
order to consolidate their hold on power and advance their ideological cause. As Colin Gray 
puts it, rational approaches typically work on the basis of a generic or universal rationality, 
thereby overlooking the possibility that different actors could make rational calculations but 
on the basis of different value rankings.20 
One attraction of a rational actor approach is that it permits analysts to think through logical 
possibilities in circumstances when they do not have much information about the other side. 
This creates a risk that analysts will fail to collect and analyze such information even if it is 
available. There will be a temptation to rely on abstract reasoning according to the rational 
actor model rather than go through the more labor-intensive task of empirical research. 
Because rational models appear to be powerful tools for prediction, they can create 
incentives that lead analysts or planners to forego the hard work that is sometimes necessary 
to learn more about the other side. In some cases, those concerned with deterrence might 
fail to obtain available information relevant to determining whether and how to proceed 
with deterrent efforts. 
The greatest weakness of the rational actor approach, however, is the sheer inability of real 
human beings to live up to its requirements. This has been the central argument of 
psychological approaches, discussed more fully below. There are inherent constraints on the 
ability of both individuals and organizations to carry out all the steps in a procedural model 
of rationality. People lack the time and brain capacity to identify all the relevant options, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Colin	  S.	  Gray,	  “The	  Reformation	  of	  Deterrence:	  Moving	  On,”	  Comparative	  Strategy	  (December	  2003).	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collect and evaluate the information necessary to calculate each option’s odds of success and 
failure, and accurately calculate the payoffs and risks associated with each option. In 
addition, there are well-documented sources of bias in human reasoning that make some 
degree of misperception and miscalculation likely. 
Defenders of rational choice approaches argue that rationality is meant only as a simplifying 
assumption, not an accurate depiction of reality. According to them, the assumption that 
people behave “as if” they are rational utility maximizers can be justified if it leads to more 
accurate predictions than can be obtained through alternative assumptions.21 This might be 
valid if one is interested in average or equilibrium behavior across a large number of actors 
and cases. As a way to model a competitive market with thousands of producers and 
consumers, use of the rational actor assumption in Economics has been highly fruitful. But a 
typical policymaker or defense planner is not concerned only with the average outcome 
across thousands of cases. Someone with policy responsibilities will be most concerned with 
how a particular individual actor is likely to behave in a particular situation. And if significant 
deviations from rationally predicted behavior are possible or even likely, then working with a 
rational actor model becomes much more problematic. 
Deterrence does work a lot of the time, and actors do sometimes act in ways consistent with 
the predictions of a rational actor model. The rational actor approach has useful advantages 
and should not be casually set aside. But given how hard it is for people to fulfill the 
requirements of the rational actor model, it could be risky to rely upon this model if viable 
alternatives are available. In U.S. foreign policy debates, a strategic culture approach has been 
the most visible alternative. Does this approach offer a superior basis for thinking about 
deterrence? 
STRATEGIC CULTURE: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
The term “strategic culture” was coined in the 1970s, but the underlying ideas have been 
around for some time. Just as a rational actor model can be applied to topics other than 
deterrence, so too can a strategic culture model. For those who embrace this framework, 
much of the focus has been on military doctrine and ways of war – the basic premise being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Milton	  Friedman,	  “The	  Methodology	  of	  Positive	  Economics,”	  in	  Essays	  in	  Positive	  Economics	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1953).	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that different states have distinct national styles in how they think about and use military 
force. From here, it is not much of a stretch to think that strategic culture might have 
implications for how an actor responds to deterrent threats as well. 
The initial interest in strategic culture subsided as U.S.-Soviet relations improved and the 
Cold War came to an end. Interest in strategic culture revived in the 1990s, thanks in part to 
a lively debate set off by a critique of the earlier work written by Iain Johnston.22 Johnston 
drew on social constructivism and identified it as the theoretical foundation for what he 
labeled as a third generation in work on strategic culture. Johnston differentiated this third, 
constructivist generation from the original first generation, and argued the earlier work 
suffered from a host of conceptual and methodological problems. On behalf of the first 
generation, Colin Gray attempted to rebut Johnston’s criticisms.23 Ever since, a number of 
scholars have attempted to render strategic culture into a useful approach for research, in 
many cases seeking a workable middle ground between or synthesis of the first and third 
generations.24 
In practice, the policy community has tended to apply a notion of strategic culture that more 
closely resembles the work of the first generation. For this reason, the following assessment 
of strengths and weaknesses focuses on the strategic culture model as the first generation 
would apply it. It distinguishes this approach from social constructivism, which is also 
concerned with culture but thinks about it in a different way. Social constructivism is 
discussed separately below. 
STRENGTHS 
The strategic culture framework derives from an enduringly powerful insight. It reflects the 
old adage to “know thy enemy.” This advice remains as valuable today as it was in Sun Tzu’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston,	  “Thinking	  about	  Strategic	  Culture,”	  International	  Security	  (spring	  1995).	  23	  Colin	  S.	  Gray,	  “Strategic	  Culture	  as	  Context:	  The	  First	  Generation	  of	  Theory	  Strikes	  Back,”	  Review	  of	  
International	  Studies	  (Jan.	  1999).	  24	  See	  John	  Glenn,	  Darryl	  Howlett	  and	  Stuart	  Poore,	  eds.,	  Neorealism	  versus	  Strategic	  Culture	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate,	  2004),	  and	  Jeannie	  L.	  Johnson,	  Kerry	  M.	  Kartchner,	  and	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Larsen,	  eds.,	  Strategic	  Culture	  and	  Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction:	  Culturally	  Based	  Insights	  into	  Comparative	  
National	  Security	  Policymaking	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008).	  For	  good	  reviews	  of	  the	  literature,	  see	  Jeffrey	  S.	  Lantis,	  “Strategic	  Culture	  and	  National	  Security	  Policy,”	  International	  Studies	  Review	  (December	  2002),	  and Christopher	  P.	  Twomey,	  “Lacunae	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  in	  International	  Security,”	  Contemporary	  Security	  Policy	  (Aug.	  2008).	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time. In crafting a strategy to respond to a potential or actual adversary, an attempt to learn 
as much about the other side as possible should improve the odds of formulating an 
effective strategic response. 
Seeking to do this also helps guard against potential weaknesses in the rational actor 
approach. Whereas a rational actor approach can encourage abstract, armchair reasoning, 
using a strategic culture framework encourages a decision-maker or planner to seek out 
information about the other side. This creates incentives to consult with historians, area 
specialists, and individuals with experience in the country or region in question. Including a 
broader range of advisors in the process should reduce the chances of misjudging how a 
particular course of action will play out. 
The strategic culture approach is also intended to reduce the chances of engaging in mirror 
imaging. If the other side thinks in a significantly different way than elites in one’s own 
country, the assumption of a shared rationality could lead strategy dangerously astray. This 
begs the question of whether the other side is really likely to behave differently, but it still 
seems prudent to ask this question explicitly rather than assume that the other actor will 
make the same choice that one would oneself. 
WEAKNESSES 
The strategic culture approach is intuitively appealing because it seems like common sense. 
Nevertheless, it has potentially significant liabilities. Most of these problems are not inherent 
in the concept of culture per se, but arise instead from strong human tendencies to apply the 
concept of culture in particular ways. These lead to several interrelated problems when 
people analyze deterrence through the lens of strategic culture. 
People relying on a strategic culture approach tend to assume that cultures are basically 
national in nature. That is, they typically view the boundaries of culture as aligning with 
specific nations or ethnic identities. When they cite examples of strategic culture, the 
examples seem invariably to involve some particular national identity. Hence, applications of 
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the concept point to a distinctly Russian or Chinese or American or Arab way of thinking 
and acting.25 
In practice, however, the boundaries of culture are not so sharply drawn. Relevant cultures 
also exist both above and below the national level.26 People can be part of larger 
transnational groupings. Those who are French or German can also see themselves as being 
European or even part of “the West.” In addition, states can contain more than one sub-
culture, with these varying by generation, political party, or region. In the United States, for 
example, the South remains a distinct region, and the coasts differ in certain ways from the 
nation’s heartland. 
If these different cultures encompass different strategic tendencies, this creates 
complications for an attempt to use the strategic culture framework. There are now 
competing strategic cultures, and an analyst who assumes the national culture predominates 
could be led astray. In Germany, for instance, political leaders might operate in an 
identifiably German manner, but they might also respond to security issues in a manner that 
better reflects a broader European strategic culture. To continue with the German example, 
a chancellor who was raised in the former East Germany might also have a rather different 
worldview than one who grew up in the West. This criticism accepts that culture matters. 
The point here is that analysts and planners can too easily move straight to focusing on a 
single, national-level culture and thereby overlook the other cultural strands that might also 
be at work. 
A second, deeper problem follows from the first. Analysts who focus on a distinctly national 
culture can find themselves on a very slippery slope that quickly descends to crude 
stereotyping. A plausible observation about a relative difference between two populations 
can harden into a fixed belief that all members of some society are incapable of acting in a 
certain way or are hard-wired to behave in some other way. It is unfortunately all too 
common to hear people say about their adversaries that they “only respect force” or “don’t 
value human life as much as we do.” The problem here is not the desire to understand the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This	  is	  quite	  pronounced	  in	  Gray,	  “Strategic	  Culture	  as	  Context.”	  26	  Twomey	  emphasizes	  this	  in	  “Lacunae	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture.”	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other side’s culture, but rather an unfortunate human tendency to understand it poorly and 
turn it into a misleading stereotype of the other. 
Another problem, closely related to the first two, involves a tendency to treat culture too 
deterministically. Strategic culture approaches tend to assume that cultures took shape long 
ago, that they tend to remain fixed, and that they lead fairly directly to people’s choices and 
behavior.27 Social constructivists dispute these assumptions. They argue that culture can be 
quite malleable and fluid, and that cultures can sometimes change dramatically in a short 
period of time. This should induce caution against making deterministic predictions on the 
basis of a particular model of a nation’s strategic culture. 
Finally, and related to this last point, strategic culture approaches also tend to underestimate 
the impact of an actor’s situation or strategic environment. Actors can sometimes find 
themselves compelled by circumstances to act in ways contrary to their normal cultural 
predispositions. This is, of course, the underlying assumption of rational deterrence theory, 
which assumes that a well-designed deterrent posture can induce an adversary to behave the 
way we want regardless of its underlying preferences. If a culturalist approach can rest upon 
observations about the weaknesses of the rational actor model, a rationalist approach can 
equally be put forward as a response to the weaknesses of a strategic culture approach. If 
each approach has strengths that address the weaknesses of the other, is it possible to fix 
their problems by combining them? 
A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES? SHARED LIMITATIONS OF 
RATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES 
It is easy to see why both rational and cultural models are so attractive to analysts. They both 
have intuitively plausible foundations. And each can be seen as a way to address critical 
problems in the other. Unfortunately, simply trying to combine the two frameworks does 
not solve these problems. They are not logically complementary. The assumptions of the 
strategic culture framework imply that the predictions of the rational actor model will often 
be wrong, and vice versa. Simply stapling the two together is likely to produce confusion and 
contradictions, not clarity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  These	  are	  core	  elements	  of	  Johnston’s	  critique.	  
  21 	  
In addition, the debate between these approaches can be seen as a manifestation of what 
psychologists have labeled the fundamental attribution error. Attribution theory in 
psychology deals with how people think about the causes of an individual’s behavior. 
Attribution theory identifies two basic options: situational and dispositional. The first 
suggests behavior results from a person’s circumstances, the second that it reflects their 
innate nature. When people view another actor as an adversary, they tend to assume that 
good behavior by the other is forced on them by circumstances, while bad behavior is a 
product of the other side’s character.28 
Traditional deterrence debates fit neatly into this framework. Rational deterrence theory 
emphasizes situational attributions. Through a proper application of deterrence, one actor 
can create circumstances that compel the other actor to behave. Rational theories lead to a 
degree of optimism about deterrence prospects because they suggest a state has the capacity 
to shape the situation so that it constrains the behavior of an otherwise bad actor. Cultural 
models reflect a dispositional focus. The other actor is dangerous, and deterrence is difficult, 
because the other is disposed to behave badly. Deterrence is not impossible, but it is not 
enough to threaten the other with some generically unfavorable circumstances. One must 
tailor the threat around circumstances that the other side will find especially unwelcome 
given its character. 
Psychologists find that humans display systematic biases when they make attributions. When 
a potential adversary behaves well, we tend to overestimate our own role in creating a 
situation that led to good behavior. When the other acts badly, we tend to assume too 
quickly that this reflects their fundamental disposition and to discount the role of 
circumstances in driving their behavior, including the potential impact of our own behavior 
on the other actor. To the extent that rational actor and strategic culture approaches to 
deterrence align with situational and dispositional modes of attribution, respectively, 
psychology suggests that both are prone to error. 
Beyond their close fit with well-established psychological dynamics, rational actor and 
strategic culture approaches have dominated thinking about deterrence for one more reason. 
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Both hold out the promise of making point predictions. Planners and decision-makers 
concerned about deterrence would ideally like to predict how a particular deterrence posture 
will influence other actors. Models that hold out the promise of making such predictions are 
hence inherently attractive. The deepest problem with both approaches, therefore, may be 
that such predictions are not possible, and the embrace of models that promise point 
predictions could prove to mislead decision-makers more than it helps them. 
Rational actor models imply all actors are basically alike. Actors will be motivated by self-
interest, and constrained by their circumstances, to make choices that maximize their utility. 
People might not make perfectly optimal choices, and there might be some minor variations 
across actors, but decisions are still likely to cluster narrowly around a uniquely best 
outcome. A rationalist approach to deterrence assumes that if the state practicing deterrence 
can credibly communicate an ability to make the outcome of challenging deterrence much 
worse than the outcome of not challenging, then we can predict that all self-interested actors 
are quite likely to make the same choice: to be deterred. 
Strategic culture models imply that all actors are different. Each will make a unique choice 
reflecting its particular strategic culture. If an analyst understands that culture, however, the 
analyst can still make a point prediction. Each actor will behave in the way that reflects its 
nature. A culturalist approach assumes that if a deterrent threat is crafted to take account of 
the other side’s nature, it will work, but otherwise it will fail. Across different actors, 
however, the appropriate deterrent posture could vary considerably. 
By seeming to promise an ability to make clear predictions, both rational actor and strategic 
culture models have obvious allure for decision-makers and planners. Unfortunately, 
however, the bases on which both approaches promise point predictions are flawed, and 
relying exclusively on either approach could prove misleading. Three interrelated issues 
suggest why rationalist and culturalist approaches are both problematic. Figure 1 illustrates 
these points. 
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FIGURE 1: Rational, Cultural, and Other Approaches Compared 
First, rational models assume that we are all the same, and cultural models that we are all 
different. It seems more accurate to assume, however, that we are partly the same and partly 
different. People across cultures still share many similarities. Some of these reflect common 
features of human nature. Others reflect the globalization process, in which people from 
different backgrounds are exposed to common aspects of world culture. Great works of art 
and literature often translate across cultural contexts because they deal with universal themes 
– love, loss, family, generational differences, triumphing over adversity – that we can all 
recognize and relate to. Yet we are not entirely the same, and art and literature can be used 
to make this point as well. Some things just do not translate. Those who emphasize strategic 
culture are correct to observe cultural differences. But they tend to focus only on the 
differences to the exclusion of the similarities. Rather than treat the existence of similarity or 
difference as a starting assumption, it might be more valuable to treat the degree of overlap 
across culturally different actors as an empirical question. Some actors might share more 
things in common, while others will have a greater divergence in their values and 
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worldviews. If actors are partly the same and partly different, it becomes difficult to predict 
either that they will all behave the same way or that they will all behave differently. Either 
outcome becomes possible. 
Second, within any given actor, internal disagreement or debate remains possible and will 
often be observed. Even an individual leader can be internally conflicted and undecided. 
Most decision-makers must also consider the views of advisors, coalition partners, 
constituents, and possibly political opponents. Across such a larger group, internal 
disagreement and debate is even more likely. A particular culture that all the actors share 
might still contain competing norms or sub-cultures, and different actors will emphasize 
different ones. Uncertainty about the nature of the situation or what course of action is best, 
along with tradeoffs among competing values, also create scope for debate.29 As a result of 
these factors, a range of different policy choices can appear reasonable. This makes point 
prediction much harder. If reasonable people can consider and debate a range of alternative 
choices, predicting their ultimate choice on the basis of either rational actor or strategic 
culture assumptions becomes quite hard. Many outcomes are possible, and other factors 
might shape the final choice. 
Third, research in psychology has demonstrated that people can deviate in substantial and 
sometimes predictable ways from ideal rationality. Where the deviations are predictable, it 
might once again become possible to make point predictions, but the behaviors observed 
will differ from what both rationalist and culturalist approaches expect. The relevant biases 
and their effects are not always knowable in advance, however, so psychological approaches 
do not offer a reliable basis for making point predictions. 
Collectively, these observations suggest that policymakers should anticipate a potentially 
wide range of possible behaviors by the actors they seek to deter, with the range of possible 
outcomes overlapping across actors but not entirely, and with final choices potentially 
influenced by psychological drivers that work against making fully rational decisions. These 
observations suggest that it will often be hard to predict with confidence the outcome of a 
particular deterrent effort. There is some modest good news, however. Each of the three 
observations about limits on the ability to make point predictions reflects an alternative 	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theoretical approach that can be applied to the question of deterrence. The next sections of 
this report briefly summarize the strengths and weaknesses of those three alternatives. 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: LOOKING FOR OVERLAP IN ACTORS’ 
VIEWS 
Social constructivism is a general approach to understanding human social behavior. Since 
the 1990s, scholars have sought to apply this approach to the study of international relations. 
Like strategic culture, social constructivism emphasizes culture, but it conceives of culture in 
a different way. Constructivists do not link culture so closely to specific nations, but instead 
focus on commonalities across states. They also view culture as malleable and subject to 
change over the short term. Many constructivists emphasize forces in the international 
system that socialize states to become more alike in their ideas about appropriate state 
behavior. 
In recent years, some scholars have started to explore the implications of constructivism for 
deterrence. The key observation is simple: deterrence is itself a social construct. To be able 
to play the deterrence “game,” actors have to share some common understandings. If there 
is no overlap in worldviews, constructing a deterrence relationship becomes harder.30 This is 
similar to the core belief in the strategic culture approach that if actors have widely divergent 
value systems, it will be hard for one side to know how to deter the other. But 
constructivism puts the point in a subtly different way that has meaningful implications. 
Actors do not have to be culturally alike in all their values for deterrence to be feasible. 
Instead, they only need to share common understandings about key points relevant to 
deterrence. In particular, it helps if they share beliefs about the legitimacy of red lines and 
the appropriateness or proportionality of responses threatened if there are transgressions of 
those red lines. 
Constructivists emphasize the importance of norms, and this extends to the realm of 
deterrence. When actors agree on norms, this makes them more likely to accept the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Emanuel	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  “Complex	  Deterrence	  in	  the	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  Era,”	  in	  T.V.	  Paul,	  Patrick	  Morgan,	  and	  James	  Wirtz,	  eds.,	  Complex	  Deterrence	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009);	  Amir	  Lupovici,	  “The	  Emerging	  Fourth	  Wave	  of	  Deterrence	  Theory—Toward	  a	  New	  Research	  Agenda,”	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  (September	  2010).	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legitimacy of deterrent threats linked to the violation of those norms. Terrorist groups are 
hard (but not impossible) to deter not so much because they have different value systems in 
general, but specifically because they view terrorism as a legitimate tactic and do not accept 
the efforts of other actors to define all terrorism as morally objectionable. 
In relation to the diagram in figure 1, social constructivism draws attention to how much 
overlap there is in the understandings of different actors. The greater the degree of overlap, 
the better the chances for establishing a workable deterrence framework. 
KEY POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
If common understandings provide important underpinnings for deterrence, then efforts to 
establish common views can be an important policy tool. This includes measures that are not 
normally thought of as being related to deterrence. Anything that increases communication 
about issues related to a potential deterrence effort can help broaden the range of overlap in 
the views held by the two sides. This suggests that strategic dialogues can have unexpected 
benefits. They can help different actors come to a mutual understanding that certain actions 
constitute red lines and that certain types of responses are likely to follow. In addition to 
strategic dialogues, a number of other interactions could contribute to building up shared 
understandings. These include track II diplomacy, arms control talks, summit meetings, and 
even cultural exchanges. Actions that seem only distantly related to deterrence can 
contribute in unexpected ways to helping establish a context in which deterrence becomes 
more feasible. 
WEAKNESSES 
The key limitation of the constructivist approach is that the predicted effects of shared 
understandings are uncertain. As the overlap in actors’ images of the world increases, this 
should improve the odds of successful deterrence, but it does not guarantee it. Actors can 
recognize the existence of a norm and still violate it. Syria’s Bashar al Assad surely knows 
there is a widely supported international taboo on chemical weapons use, but he has still 
been willing to cross this particular red line as part of his attempt to hold on to power. 
Constructivism usefully draws attention to the ideational context in which deterrence efforts 
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unfold, but does not provide a silver bullet that can fix the limitations of rational actor and 
strategic culture models. 
DOMESTIC POLITICS: TRYING TO INFLUENCE INTERNAL DEBATES 
Analysts of international relations have long recognized that there can be significant 
disagreement inside a state or organization over what course of action to take. People can 
disagree for a wide range of reasons. In some cases, they have different parochial interests. 
In other cases, they might have different instincts concerning strategy, such as whether a 
hardline or conciliatory approach is likely to work best. The academic literature on 
deterrence has mostly not focused on how deterrence strategies might interact with domestic 
politics inside the target state. But a number of discussions of international bargaining more 
generally have taken this possibility into account.31 
The basic rule of thumb these analysts have identified is simple and fairly intuitive. As a 
general rule, a state should seek to strengthen or at least not undermine the position of 
moderates in the other side’s internal debate. And it should similarly seek to weaken or at 
least not reinforce the position of the other side’s hardliners. What does this mean in 
practice? Suppose a relatively moderate faction has come to power in a state, but still faces 
significant competition from a more hardline faction. If the moderates reach out to seek a 
relaxation in tensions, a state should reciprocate that gesture and seek to reward the other 
side’s moderates. Otherwise, it discredits them and gives ammunition to the argument of the 
other side’s hardliners that one’s own state is inflexibly hostile toward the other side. 
Conversely, if the other side’s hardliners are in power and ratchet up the level of conflict, a 
state should stand firm or react with a modest increase in its own preparedness for conflict 
and not make unwarranted concessions. This can help the other side’s moderates argue that 
their own state’s aggressive behavior is responsible for provoking the conflict. 
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Needless to say, this is harder to do in practice than in theory. Efforts to influence internal 
debates inside another actor can backfire. If actors in another country believe a state is trying 
to interfere in its internal affairs, they can react with nationalistic pride against the effort and 
rally behind hardline policies. If a state seeks to craft a deterrence or other influence strategy 
to take account of internal debates in another actor, it must try to do so in a way that does 
not give the appearance of trying to change domestic political outcomes in the other side. 
The goal is to act in a way that gives credence to the arguments of moderates in the other 
side’s internal debates without giving the appearance that the state wants to determine who 
actually wins political power in the other side. 
Apart from the difficulty of implementing a strategy to influence internal debates in another 
actor, a domestic politics framework has one other potential weakness. It could lead an 
analyst to see greater domestic debate than actually exists. The appearance of debate could 
be misleading. It could be part of a ruse to lull a state into moderating its own stance when 
the other side actually has no intention of adopting a more moderate course. Or the debate 
could be real, but the moderate faction too weak to influence policy. If hardliners are fully in 
control and can quash or resist pressure from moderates for a change of course, then 
strategies predicated on affecting domestic debates inside the other actor are unlikely to 
work. Nevertheless, there are often internal disagreements inside actors, and strategic 
planning should not ignore such debates where they exist. 
PSYCHOLOGY: ANTICIPATING OTHERS’ BIASES AND RISK 
ORIENTATIONS 
In the existing research on deterrence, approaches that draw on findings from the field of 
psychology – and more recently from neuroscience – are the best developed of the possible 
alternatives to rational actor and strategic culture approaches. There is no single unified or 
coherent psychological model. Instead, analysts have drawn on a range of different findings 
in psychological research to develop insights about how the human brain might affect 
deterrence outcomes. Much of this work has been concerned with highlighting flaws in the 
rational actor assumption. 
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THE INITIAL WAVE: SOURCES OF BIAS AND MISPERCEPTION 
Starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, critics began questioning the rationality 
assumption in mainstream deterrence theory.32 They turned to research in psychology to 
make the case that human decision-makers are not capable of fulfilling the requirements of 
the rational actor assumption.33 The first wave of research emphasized certain well-
documented biases in human reasoning that would be likely to produce misperceptions. 
These misperceptions, the literature suggested, could lead deterrence to fail even in 
situations in which deterrent threats should have been regarded as credible. 
The research on psychology and deterrence ultimately sorted the various biases into two 
basic categories: cognitive (or unmotivated) and motivated.34 The work of Robert Jervis35 is 
probably the best know explication of cognitive biases, while Ned Lebow36 made the case for 
the greater importance of motivated biases. Cognitive biases arise from the power of pre-
existing beliefs and images. In short, people see what they expect to see. They try to make 
new information fit already existing beliefs. It therefore takes a great deal of discrepant 
information before people revise their beliefs. If leaders in state A view state B as irresolute, 
it will take a great deal of effort for state B to convince state A that it really will back up its 
deterrent threats. 
Motivated biases basically involve wishful thinking. People see what they want to see. Here, 
decision-makers have some underlying need or desire that is driving their behavior, and they 
are motivated to interpret reality as being favorable to their needs. Take, for example, a 
situation in which the leader of a state felt he was losing support domestically and believed 	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he needed to provoke and win a confrontation with a foreign adversary in order to rally the 
support to stay in power. In those circumstances, the leader would be motivated to believe 
the other side would back down, giving him the diplomatic victory he needs. Such a bias 
could lead a decision-maker to discount even highly credible deterrent messages from the 
other side. From the perspective of deterrence theory, this means a deterrent threat can fail 
even when the deterring side does everything right to make its posture credible.37  
For a policymaker or planner, the main drawback of this first wave of psychological 
literature is that it offered very little predictive ability. It is not easy to anticipate the 
particular biases or misperceptions that will affect the other side or to predict when these 
will be sufficiently severe to cause deterrence failure. Some research suggests that as the 
stakes increase people become more careful in their decision-making and misperception less 
likely.38 Other research finds that high levels of stress degrade decision-making.39 One can 
find historical examples of both results: Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis proceeded 
very deliberately and cautiously, while Stalin seemingly had a nervous breakdown when 
Hitler’s forces invaded the Soviet Union. It is hence hard to use the psychological approach 
as a basis for predicting when deterrent threats will succeed or fail. The main takeaway from 
the first wave was simply to sound a note of caution: deterrence can be fragile even when we 
think it should be robust and may be more prone to failure than rational deterrence theory 
would lead us to expect. 
PROSPECT THEORY: PREDICTABLE DEVIATIONS FROM RATIONALITY 
By the 1990s, IR scholars working on deterrence had discovered Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work on what they came to label “prospect theory.”40 Prospect theory deals with how people 
make decisions in situations that involve risk. Based on a series of psychology experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated consistent patterns of deviation from the predictions 
of the rational actor model. Specifically, when given a choice between a relatively riskier 	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option and a relatively safer option, people do not always make the choice that maximizes 
expected utility. 
The most relevant finding from prospect theory is “loss aversion.” People are more 
motivated to avoid a loss than they are to make the equivalent gain. This, in turn, affects risk 
orientations. When humans find themselves in the domain of gains – that is, two choices 
that both promise a positive result – they become risk averse. Given a choice between a sure 
gain of a certain amount and a gamble that promises a bigger gain but at some risk of ending 
up with nothing, people choose the sure thing, even when it offers less expected utility than 
the alternative. In the domain of losses, however, this pattern reverses and people become 
risk acceptant. They will gamble on a possibly greater loss if that option also offers the 
possibility of escaping what would otherwise be a guaranteed loss of a lesser amount. 
People identify gains and losses relative to a reference point, but identifying the reference 
point can be tricky. Often, it will be the status quo, but not always. The reference point can 
also be set by a desire to regain past glories or to achieve some future aspiration or to have 
what others have. 
Prospect theory has potential implications for deterrence.41 First, it suggests that a state 
needs to be careful not to issue deterrent threats that move another actor into the domain of 
losses. Threats that are particularly harsh or broad or unexpected could convince another 
actor that it will end up with a bad outcome if it does not act, and this might lead it to take 
the risky gamble of challenging the deterrent posture in hopes of escaping from the shadow 
of the deterrent threat. Second, prospect theory suggests that the requirements for credibility 
may vary across domains. For a target state that is in the domain of gains, a deterrent threat 
does not need to be highly credible to be effective. Because actors are risk averse in the 
domain of gains, they will not want to take the risk of challenging even a moderately credible 
deterrent posture. If the other side is already in the domain of losses however, achieving a 
credible deterrent will be much harder because the other side will be inclined to accept the 
risk of challenging deterrence. 	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In terms of crafting strategy, prospect theory suggests that efforts at framing the situation 
might be important. Gains and losses are defined relative to a reference point. If a state can 
help frame the interaction in a way that encourages the other side to see itself in the domain 
of gains, deterrence becomes an easier task. Successful framing, however, is likely to be quite 
a bit more difficult. 
One advantage of prospect theory is that it holds out a promise of enabling predictions. If 
we can determine the other side’s reference point and whether it sees itself in the domain of 
gains or losses, we can predict the likelihood that deterrence will work. In practice, however, 
prediction remains hard, for at least two reasons. First, ascertaining whether the other side 
sees itself in a domain of either gains or losses might be quite hard. This is not always true – 
countries that have recently lost territory or that face a serious internal threat to regime 
survival will almost certainly act like they are in the domain of losses. But in other cases this 
might not be as easy to predict. Second, and more problematically, the predictions of 
prospect theory are themselves only probabilistic. Some actors make choices contrary to 
what prospect theory predicts. The risk orientations it highlights are tendencies, not iron 
laws of human nature. Hence, an actor in the domain of gains could still surprise us and take 
a risky gamble. Even if it does not enable point predictions, however, prospect theory is 
valuable. It suggests some important rules of thumb about trying to avoid inadvertently 
pushing actors into the domain of losses. 
NEUROSCIENCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: THE RETURN OF EMOTIONS 
Traditional research in psychology has been supplemented by the emergence of new 
technologies that enable observation of the human brain as it operates. This work in the field 
of neuroscience has posed a new set of challenges to the assumption of rationality. Some of 
the previous research findings from psychology have been amalgamated with some of the 
findings from neuroscience in the school of thought known as “behavioral economics.” 
Economics has traditionally been the branch of the social sciences that most deeply 
embraced the rational actor assumption. Behavioral economics offers an alternative 
approach that draws on a wide range of findings about how the human brain really operates. 
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Much of the research that informs behavioral economics has been summarized for a general 
audience in Daniel Kahneman’s recent book Thinking Fast and Slow. 42 
With respect to international relations in general and deterrence in particular, three 
interrelated themes in the recent work stand out. First, most specialists now reject the idea 
that rationality and emotions should be treated as entirely separate and opposed forces. 
Considerable research suggests instead that the ability to make rational decisions depends to 
some extent on emotions. The emotional feelings people have about alternative outcomes 
feed into the process of assigning value – or utility – to those outcomes. When people have 
distinct likes or dislikes, these become part of the yardstick by which they evaluate which 
choices are better or worse.43 When emotions and rational thinking come into conflict, 
however, emotions will often swamp rational thought and drive behavior. 
Second, scholars now talk about the impact of “emotions” in the plural, rather than 
“emotion” in the singular.44 This reflects the fact that people can experience different 
emotions. Several distinct emotional states are possible, such as happiness, sadness, or anger. 
Research shows that different emotional states have different effects. One of the most 
important distinctions involves the differences between anger and fear. Fear tends to induce 
caution, whereas anger makes people more likely to take risks and act without much concern 
for the consequences. This has potential implications for a strategy like deterrence. A 
deterrent threat that creates a measure of fear in the target, or that takes advantage of a 
preexisting fear, has a decent chance of working effectively. In contrast, deterrent threats 
that anger the target are more likely to backfire and provoke escalation. 
Third, several lines of research suggest that people give significant weight to considerations 
involving fairness or justice.45 When people believe they are treated unfairly, this creates 
particularly strong reactions. Experiments involving the well-known ultimatum game show 
that people consistently reject highly unequal distributions of benefit even when, in strictly 	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  and	  Giroux,	  2011).	  See	  also	  Dan	  Ariely,	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  Irrational	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  Collins,	  2008).	  43	  Jonathan	  Mercer,	  “Rationality	  and	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  in	  International	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  International	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  (winter	  2005).	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  An	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  in	  Jeffrey	  W.	  Knopf,	  ed.,	  
Security	  Assurances	  and	  Nuclear	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  (Stanford,	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  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  implications	  for	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  see	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  Nonproliferation:	  Examining	  the	  Linkage	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  International	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  (winter	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economic terms of expected utility, these choices actually leave them worse off.46 This 
suggests that states should be careful to avoid deterrent postures that appear egregiously 
unfair or unjust given the prevailing beliefs of the other side. 
This last point could have implications for extended deterrence. An extended deterrent that 
covers threats against an ally’s long-standing homeland territory will raise few eyebrows. But 
efforts to protect an ally that has recently conquered new territory or that is engaged in 
domestic suppression of a particular ethnic or religious group might be harder to carry off. 
Other actors will likely regard such allied security guarantees as unjust and will be more likely 
to react with defiance than with compliance to such deterrent threats. 
Recent work in neuroscience and behavioral economics has added depth and nuance to 
earlier research in psychology. It has not, however, brought about improved predictive 
power. Some research has suggested that experienced elites are not as susceptible to these 
psychological effects compared to the average person who takes part in psychology 
experiments.47 This does not mean that veteran decision-makers will behave as perfectly 
rational actors. All human beings are subject to these psychological tendencies, just to 
varying degrees. This variation creates complications when it comes to using behavioral 
economics to make predictions however. Still, to the extent one can identify the particular 
bias or heuristic or emotional state that is likely to be uppermost in the minds of decision-
makers on the other side, it might be possible to make some reasonable predictions about 
the likely effectiveness of different deterrent threats. 
SUMMING UP THE ALTERNATIVES 
Preceding sections have reviewed the potential of approaches based on social 
constructivism, domestic politics, and psychology and neuroscience to provide frameworks 
for deterrence analysis. None of the alternatives, taken either singly or in combination, offers 
a complete framework. They usefully supplement prevailing approaches that rely on rational 
actor or strategic culture models, but do not fully replace them. 	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  the	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  War	  (Cambridge	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  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	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  Jonathan	  Mercer,	  “Emotional	  Beliefs,”	  International	  Organization	  (winter	  2010);	  Stein,	  “The	  Psychology	  of	  Assurance.”	  47	  Emilie	  M.	  Hafner-­‐Burton,	  D.	  Alex	  Hughes,	  and	  David	  G.	  Victor,	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The main limitation of the alternative approaches is that they are not highly predictive. To an 
extent, that was the point. Rationalist and culturalist assumptions promise greater predictive 
power than is possible. The other approaches help us understand why point predictions are 
generally not possible. 
The value of learning about constructivism, domestic politics, and psychology is to sensitize 
decision-makers and planners to aspects of deterrence encounters they might otherwise 
overlook. Constructivism draws attention to the degree of overlap in two sides’ worldviews 
that affect their ability to reach a mutual understanding on deterrence. Can they agree that 
certain actions constitute legitimate red lines and that certain responses to violations are 
appropriate? Thinking about internal politics highlights the potential for internal debates and 
encourages policymakers to consider the range of debate and the internal balance of power 
among competing factions on the other side. Is it possible to help tilt the balance in a 
favorable direction? In addition, consideration of domestic politics will help identify possible 
internal drivers of the other side’s behavior that could lead to misperception in the form of 
motivated biases. Finally, research in psychology and neuroscience remind us of the many 
ways human beings can fail to act rationally and the apparently unavoidable impact of 
emotions upon decision-making. 
The alternative approaches also have important policy implications. They reveal how actions 
that we might not traditionally associate with deterrence can help create the context for 
making deterrence stable and effective. Strategic dialogues, for example, can be a vehicle for 
building shared understandings that improve the prospects for deterrence. Efforts to create 
situations that place the other side in the domain of gains can reduce the likelihood of 
challenges to deterrence. Tacit alliances with the other side’s moderates can reduce the 
influence of hardliners who might be pushing for actions that create a risk of conflict. 
Much of U.S. deterrent planning has traditionally focused on targeting – placing “warheads 
on foreheads” as people in the military sometimes put it. This continues to be an important 
element of the deterrence planning process. But it is far from exhausting everything that 
needs to be taken into account when considering the use of a deterrence strategy. 
Broadening the range of perspectives that decision-makers consider will enable them to 
include a wider range of relevant factors in the process of developing deterrent postures. 
  36 	  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Deterrence strategies involve trying to influence the decision-making of another actor. 
Because of this, efforts to determine whether to employ a strategy of deterrence or how to 
implement such a strategy require attempting to forecast what things will influence the other 
actor and how that influence will be exerted. There are several models or frameworks 
available that could assist with efforts to anticipate how another actor will be influenced. In 
practice, the most prominent public debates related to deterrence in the United States have 
tended to reflect two main approaches. People tend to assume either that the other side will 
behave like a rational actor or that it will be driven by a unique strategic culture. While both 
approaches have merit, extensive critiques have revealed that both also have significant 
limitations.  
This research project has reviewed three other approaches that have been applied to 
studying deterrence: social constructivism, domestic politics, and psychology and 
neuroscience. None of these approaches, either alone or in combination, offers a perfect 
framework for predicting the outcomes of deterrence efforts. Each adds valuable insights, 
however, that are relevant to developing deterrence strategies. They draw attention to the 
degree of overlap in how the two sides understand key issues related to deterrence, to the 
range of internal debate on the other side, and to common biases and heuristics likely to 
affect the decisions of actors on the receiving end of deterrent threats. In particular, recent 
work has highlighted the dangers of pushing the other side into the domain of losses or 
tapping into underlying concerns about justice and fairness.  
This study recommends that, in thinking about whether and how to deter other actors, 
analysts make use of all the different models available for anticipating how the other side will 
be influenced. This will not guarantee success in deterrence, but compared to relying on just 
a single framework for thinking about deterrence, use of multiple “models” should reduce 
the chances of overlooking a critical flaw in deterrence planning. Making sure that 
policymakers and planners are familiar with a range of alternative approaches should 
therefore improve the U.S. ability to craft effective deterrent strategies. In addition, 
familiarity with alternatives to rational actor and strategic culture approaches also 
underscores the wisdom of an earlier evaluation of U.S. deterrence strategy. If the goal is to 
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influence the behavior of another actor, it is prudent to think about all the different ways 
available to achieve influence and not just narrowly in terms of deterrence.48  
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